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I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Textron Inc.,' the First Circuit Court of Appeals
sought to reduce abusive tax shelters and thereby curb corporate social
irresponsibility.2 At the intersection of the work product doctrine and tax
policy, the First Circuit located a jurisprudential site in which it could
circumvent dominant views on the nature and purpose of firms3 but also
from which it may potentially intervene in future regulatory conflicts
that involve corporate financial documents.4 However, more significant
than the First Circuit's endpoint is how it got there. The majority's ratio-
nale made its way erratically, hoping the ground would not shift, per-
haps knowing that only its clumsy gait kept it on the move.
* Articles & Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011,
University of Miami School of Law.
1. 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010).
2. Id. at 31-32 (indicating that giving the IRS access to Textron's tax accrual workpapers
"serves the legitimate, and important, function of detecting and disallowing abusive tax shelters").
3. See infra Part Hl.C.
4. Various critics of the First Circuit's decision have correctly noted that the majority's
decision to create a stricter standard for the invocation of work product protection for dual purpose
documents, see Textron, 577 F.3d at 31 (holding that Textron's tax accrual workpapers are not
entitled to work product protection as a matter of law because they were not prepared "for
litigation") (emphasis added), may have far-reaching effects in the private and public sectors. See
id. at 37-38 (Torruella, J., dissenting); Ronald L. Buch, The Touch and Feel of Work Product,
TAX NOTEs 915, 917 (Aug. 31, 2009) (noting that the First Circuit's "newly pronounced test for
work product may likewise be applied to the IRS").
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In Textron, various social, economic, and legal trajectories inter-
sect, creating a unique example of judicial rehashing during a time of
crisis-in the instant case, the financial crisis. During a four-year
period,' spanning the overture and crescendo of the Great Recession of
2008,6 Textron and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) waged war over
potential unpaid taxes that resulted from several sale-in, lease-out
(SILO) transactions' Textron entered into from 1998 through 2001.8
Textron's tax accrual workpapers' for its 2001 tax return became central
to the IRS's ability to assess and collect taxes from Textron.' 0 Conse-
quently, Textron asserted that the IRS was not entitled to see its
workpapers because they were protected by the attorney-client privilege,
the tax-practitioner privilege, and, most importantly, by the work prod-
uct doctrine." It is important to note that what was at stake for the
IRS-what the Service gains by the judiciary granting it access to a
corporation's tax accrual workpapers-is a significant bargaining
advantage in negotiations with the taxpayer.12 Ultimately, the district
court granted Textron's workpapers protection under the attorney-client
privilege" and the work product doctrine.14 The First Circuit en banc
vacated the district court's decision, denying Textron's tax accrual
workpapers protection under the work product doctrine as a matter of
law." Marshalling forth a rationale that stumbles along, the First Circuit
5. The IRS first issued a summons to Textron on June 2, 2005, for its tax accrual
workpapers. See United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 147 (D.R.I. 2007), vacated,
577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009). The First Circuit rendered its en banc decision on August 13, 2009.
See Textron, 577 F.3d at 21.
6. See Catherine Rampell, 'Great Recession': A BriefEtymology, EcONOMIX (Mar. 11, 2009,
5:39 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com (providing a brief etymology of the phrase "Great
Recession").
7. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
8. Textron, 577 F.3d at 23.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. The First Circuit noted in Textron that:
[T]he Supreme Court explained in Arthur Young, tax accrual workpapers provide a
resource for the IRS, if the IRS can get access to them, by 'pinpoint[ing] the soft
spots on a corporation's tax return by highlighting those areas in which the
corporate taxpayer has taken a position that may, at some later date, require
payment of additional taxes' and providing 'an item-by-item analysis of the
corporation's potential exposure to additional liability.
Textron, 577 F.3d at 23 (quoting United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 (1984)).
11. Id. at 24.
12. "Once the IRS [knows] which questionable positions a corporation took on its tax returns
and how willing the corporation was to litigate those positions, there would be no real room for
negotiation." Note, Work Product-United States v. Arthur Young & Co.-A Work Product
Privilege for Tax Accrual Workpapers, 9 J. CORP. L. 126, 138 (1983).
13. See United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 147 (D.R.I. 2007).
14. Id. at 150-51.
15. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 30-31.
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turned not only to the mystical, noting that tax accrual workpapers do
not have the "touch and feel" 16 of work product, but also to notions of
fairness, noting the inequity17 of abusive tax shelters. From the First
Circuit's summoning of tax policy' and its substantial deviationl 9 from
the prevailing view of the scope of work product protection afforded
dual-purpose documents-specifically, tax accrual workpapers-
emerges a potential jurisprudential space within which the judiciary can
bypass dominant assumptions2 0 regarding corporate law and corporate
social responsibility. Moreover, it is a space from which the judiciary
can emerge as a significant player in curbing corporate abuse. However,
the First Circuit's opinion, perhaps, more effectively serves as a caution-
ary tale. If courts seek to take a more active role, then they must be sure
to refine their analytical methods in the hopes of minimizing the collat-
eral damage done to doctrines-like the work product privilege-that
have a significant impact beyond the narrow context of any single dis-
pute. If a court's determinations in times of crisis are to retain legitimacy
and not be mere responses to the historical moment, then, at the very
least, a court's proof must appear sound.
This note argues that the majority's opinion represents an intriguing
but flawed judicial positioning within the current legal framework-a
framework that must increasingly reckon with a social subtext that hums
with questions about the ability of government to rein in corporate
power and abuse. 2' Part II of this note presents an assessment of the
underlying legal frameworks informing the First Circuit's opinion. This
includes an examination of tax policy and tax shelter reform, a presenta-
tion of the nature and role of tax accrual workpapers, a look at the pre-
vailing views regarding corporate law and corporate social
responsibility, and a historical overview of the work product doctrine,
including an assessment of the doctrine's development vis-A-vis tax
accrual workpapers. Part III of this note examines the First Circuit's
opinion, focusing on the majority's policy-driven rationale and its short-
16. Id.
17. Id. at 31.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See generally Matt Taibbi, Obama's Big Sellout, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 10, 2009, at 43;
Margaret E. Tahyar, The Dodd Bill's Effect on Corporate Governance and Executive
Compensation Processes, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION (Nov. 24, 2009, 12:13 PM), http://blogs.1aw.harvard.edulcorpgov/20091
1/24/the-dodd-bills-effect-on-corporate-goveance-and-executive-compensation-processses/;
Elizabeth Warren, Taking Stock: What Has the Troubled Asset Relief Program Achieved?, THE
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Jan.
2, 2010, 11:20 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/01/02/taking-stock-what-has-the-
troubled-asset-relief-program-achieved/.
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comings, while examining counterpoints offered by the dissent and other
critics. Part IV of this note analyzes the majority's reworking of the
work product doctrine. This analysis includes an evaluation of the poten-
tial of using the work product doctrine, coupled with tax policy consid-
erations, to dodge prevailing views regarding the propriety of laying
upon corporations an ethical charge to be socially responsible. Part V
offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A. Tax Policy and Tax Shelters
Taxation is a social tool, whose primary policy considerations
reveal that it is an instrument whose function originates with the com-
munity that is subject to its vice-grip. First, "taxes are needed to raise
revenue for necessary governmental functions, such as the provision of
public goods."22 Second, "[t]axation can have a redistributive function,23
aimed at reducing the unequal24 distribution of income and wealth that
results from the normal operation of a market-based economy."2 5 Along
with raising revenue and redistributing wealth, "[t]axation also has a
regulatory component: It can be used to steer private sector activity in
the directions desired by governments."26
Corporations, however, often seek to cast aside the social impera-
tives of tax collection and engage in strategic tax behavior, hoping to
22. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REv. 1, 4 (2006).
23. Reuven Avi-Yonah notes that:
The income tax was substituted for the tariffs because of its redistributive impact.
The post-Civil War industrialization and urbanization had led to a shift from a
mostly agrarian society to one dominated by large industrial corporations and a
sharp rise in inequality, as measured by the distribution of income or wealth.
Id. at 11 (citing RICHARD J. JOSEPH, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN INCOME TAX: THE REVENUE
Acr oF 1894 AND rTS AFrERMATH 30-33 (2004)).
24. Avi-Yonah explains that there are three central arguments that "contend for the
desirability of redistribution from a societal perspective." Id. at 15. First, "[iun a democracy, all
power ultimately should be accountable to the people. Private accumulations of power are by
definition unaccountable, since the holders of power are neither elected by the people nor have
their power delegated from the people's representatives." Id. Second, taxation's redistributive
function fosters a "liberal conception of equality," id. at 16, whereby "every social 'sphere' should
have its own appropriate distributive principles and that possession of goods relevant to one
sphere should not automatically translate into dominance in other spheres as well." Id. at 16.
Finally, taxation's redistributive function curbs the "negative effects of extreme inequalities." Id.
at 17. Specifically, "revolutions are most likely to occur in societies that have experienced a
period of economic growth that lifts the standard of living and expectations of all members of a
given society, followed by .. . [a] shock that reduces the standard of living of the majority while
leaving the rich unaffected." Id.(citing TED ROBERT GuRR, WHY MEN REBEL 46-58 (1970)).
25. Id. at 3.
26. Id.
CURBING CORPORATE ABUSE
evade full payment of tax liability.2 7 Commentators explain that:
[T]he modem literature on tax enforcement assumes that there exists
an "enforcement pyramid." At the bottom are the majority of citizens
whose inclination is to try to comply with the tax law. As you go up
the pyramid, the appetite for avoidance increases and the number of
citizens decreases, and the type of enforcement changes from cooper-
ation and the provision of information to increasingly harsher
enforcement measures. Where the pyramid is reversed and most citi-
zens do not cooperate, enforcement fails. In that way tax law is no
different than other laws: A modem state cannot exist unless most
citizens could be expected to comply with the law most of the time.28
Significantly, the largest corporations often represent a vast majority of
the underreporting of income.2 9 Moreover, firms with large deficiencies
have a tendency to fight the IRS's collection efforts the hardest, drag-
ging out the legal process to its extreme, in order to secure the most
favorable settlement possible.o Especially relevant to the First Circuit's
decision is the fact that "[t]ax considerations contributed to the corporate
governance crisis in various ways."" First, "tax sheltering opportunities
offered a rationale for reduced transparency that managers could then
exploit to siphon resources from their firms without being observed by
regulatory authorities, shareholders, or investors."3 2 Second, "tax con-
siderations encouraged the use of incentive compensation, both to avoid
an ill-conceived $1 million ceiling on deductible annual salary payments
to top executives at publicly traded companies and to permit executives
to defer tax on much of what they were being paid."33
27. See generally Michelle Hanlon et al., An Empirical Examination of Corporate Tax
Noncompliance, in TAXING CORPORATE INCOME iN TRE 21ST CENTURY 171 (Alan J. Auerbach et
al. eds., 2007); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporate Social Responsibility and Strategic Tax
Behavior (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 06-008, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=944793; Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax
Avoidance and Firm Value (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11241, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=689562; Daniel Shaviro, The 2008-09 Financial Crisis:
Implications for Income Tax Reform (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 09-35, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1442089.
28. Avi-Yonah, supra note 27, at 18.
29. For example, "[clorporate underreporting in 2001 [was] estimated at $29.9 billion, of
which corporations with over $10 million in assets make up $25 billion." Hanlon et al., supra note
27, at 175.
30. See id. at 183.
31. Shaviro, supra note 27, at 19.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citation omitted); see also Hanlon et al., supra note 27, at 172 ("[B]oth the percentage
of annual compensation that is bonus and the level of equity incentives from exercising stock
options are positively related to the proposed deficiency, indicating that executive compensation
may be associated with tax aggressiveness.").
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All of this, of course, is an old story,3 4 as evident from the fact that
the IRS has taken significant strides to curb3 5 abusive tax positions since
the tax shelter wave 3 6 of the late 1990s. Nevertheless, strategic tax
behavior remains an ongoing problem-one that contributed to the cor-
porate governance abuses and failings of the late 2000s." Indeed, the
complications and difficulties that the IRS experiences in settling with
large corporations provided a central (tax) context for the First Circuit's
decision in Textron.8
B. The Nature and Purpose of Tax Accrual Workpapers
The function of tax accrual workpapers are at the very heart of the
First Circuit's decision in Textron. Tax accrual workpapers, 9 which are
also known as the "noncurrent tax workpapers, tax pool analysis, or tax
contingency workpapers,"'o contain analysis that "determines what
amount the company should keep in its tax contingency reserve."4 1
"Taxpayers generate these documents not because they want to but
because they have to."42 Specifically, "[u]nder federal securities laws,
public corporations are required to file annual financial statements with
the Securities and Exchange Commission."4 3 A corporation's statements
34. See generally Frontline: Tax Me If You Can (PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2004),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/.
35. See generally I.R.S. Notice 2009-59, 2009-31 I.R.B., available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/
2009-31 IRB/arO7.html.
36. See Frontline: Tax Me If You Can, supra note 34.
37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38. See United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc) ("It is because
the collection of revenue is essential to government that administrative discovery, along with
many other comparatively unusual tools, are furnished to the IRS.").
39. For example, Textron's tax accrual workpapers included the following:
1. A spreadsheet that contains (a) lists of items on Textron's tax returns, which, in
the opinion of Textron's counsel, involve issues on which the tax laws are unclear,
and, therefore, may be challenged by the IRS; (b) estimates by Textron's counsel
expressing, in percentage terms, judgments regarding Textron's chances of
prevailing in any litigation over those issues (the "hazards of litigation of
percentages"); and (c) the dollar amounts reserved to reflect the possibility that
Textron might not prevail in such litigation (the "tax reserve amounts").
2. Backup workpapers consisting of the previous year's spreadsheet and earlier
drafts of the spreadsheet together with notes and memoranda written by Textron's
in-house tax attorneys reflecting their opinions as to which items should be included
on the spreadsheet and the hazard of litigation percentage that should apply to each
item.
United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 142-43 (D.R.I. 2007).
40. Note, supra note 12, at 128.
41. Id.





"must be certified by an independent auditor to verify that they provide a
fair representation of the entity's financial condition in compliance with
generally accepted accounting principle standards."" A corporation's
workpapers are "integral to this reporting process in that they provide an
amount to be included in the tax reserve account that reflects potential
future liability for additional taxes in the event the government identi-
fies, challenges, and litigates certain positions taken on returns and a
court disallows them." 45
Significantly, corporations produce workpapers "even if they do
not anticipate having to set aside a tax reserve (because they have to
justify to auditors the absence of a contingent-tax reserve), and they cre-
ate tax reserves even if they do not anticipate litigation (including
deferred-tax reserves for noncontingent taxes)."" If a public corporation
fails to create tax accrual workpapers and a contingency reserve, then it
may face severe consequences-mainly, it "would likely be delisted by
its exchange, and it would no longer be permitted to conduct business as
a public company."47 Of course, corporations, their attorneys, and
accountants have "vigorously resisted the efforts of the IRS to reach
these workpapers, viewing them as beyond the summons power pro-
vided in section 7602 of the [Internal Revenue] Code .... "48
C. Corporate Law and the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate
Prevailing views regarding corporate law and corporate social
responsibility provide another contextual layer to the First Circuit's
decision in Textron. Notions about the proper role of corporate social
responsibility have developed alongside the disparate views that have
emerged regarding the nature and purpose of corporate law.49 The domi-




47. Id. (citing United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818-19 & nn.13-14
(1984)).
48. Note, IRS Access to Tax Accrual Workpapers: Legal Considerations and Policy
Concerns, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 468, 471 (1982) (citing I.R.C. § 7602 (1976)).
49. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Dganit Sivan, A Historical Perspective on
Corporate Form and Real Entity: Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE FiRM
AS AN Errrry 153-85 (Yuri Biondi et al. eds., 2007); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Perspective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002); Avi-Yonah, supra note 27, at 6-12.
50. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 27, at 3 (noting that the "nexus of contracts view of the
corporation ... is the dominant view among contemporary corporate scholars").
2011]1 651
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tracts."' Based on a notion of strong property rights,5 2 the contractual
approach to corporate law sees shareholders as residual claimants.
Essentially, shareholders enter into (incomplete) contracts with a man-
ager, who subsequently enters into transactions and manages the firm in
the interests of the shareholders.54 Firm managers are the agents of
shareholders. Under the contractual view, also commonly known as
agency theory, "the central 'problem' of corporate governance is the
question of how to minimize the (harmful) consequences of the separa-
tion of ownership and control within public companies ... by reference
to competitive market pressures coupled with market-based incentive
and disciplinary mechanisms."5
A critical premise of the contractual view of corporate law is that
the firm is purely a legal fiction.56 This premise has critical implications
for notions about the social responsibilities of firms. Under the contrac-
tual view of corporate law, "there is . . . only one social responsibility of
business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits . . . ."I' There are three primary rationales-aside
from concerns about the emergence of socialism 5 -for the contractual
view's distaste for imposing social responsibilities on firms.59 First,
"since management are deploying the shareholders' money, they should
concentrate only on one overriding objective, maximizing the sharehold-
ers' profits . . . ."60 Second, "corporate social responsibility places too
much trust in corporate management, and permitting more than one
51. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNoMIc
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991).
52. See Olivier Weinstein, The Current State of the Economic Theory of the Firm:
Contractual, Competence-Based, and Beyond, in THE FIRM AS AN ENTrrY 26-27 (Yuri Biondi et
al. eds., 2007).
53. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 67-70.
54. See id. at 24.
55. Marc T. Moore & Antoine Rebbrioux, From Minimization to Exploitation: Re-
Conceptualizing the Corporate Governance Problem 3 (Reflexive Governance in the Pub. Interest
Working Paper No. REFGOV-CG-32, 2009), available at hhtp://ssrn.com/abstract=1324127.
56. See EASTERBROOK & FISCREL, supra note 51, at 12 ("The 'personhood' of a corporation is
a matter of convenience rather than reality ... ); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM 17 ("A corporation is an
artificial person . . . .").
57. Friedman, supra note 56, at 32 (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
133 (1962)).
58. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 39 ("All competition produces
dislocation-all progress produces dislocations . . . and to try to stop the wrenching shifts of a
capitalist economy is to try to stop economic growth."); Friedman, supra note 56, at SM17 ("The
businessmen [who] believe they are defending free enterprise when they declaim that business is
not concerned 'merely' with profit but also with promoting desirable social ends ... are preaching
pure and unadulterated socialism.").




measure of managerial success would enhance the agency cost problem
and make it impossible to evaluate managers with any reasonable degree
of objectivity . . . ."61 Third, "by applying the nexus of contracts theory
... opponents to corporate social responsibility see the corporation as a
legal fiction of intertwined sets contracts [sic] and as a nonexistent entity
. . . incapable of having ethical duties or corporate social
responsibilities."6 2
Although the contractual view of corporate law is the dominant
framework, it is not the only view.6 1 Specifically, alongside the contrac-
tual view have emerged the artificial entity view and the real entity
view.' A central premise of the artificial entity view is that "the corpo-
ration is primarily a creature of the state . . . ."ss The real entity view
sees "the corporation as an entity separate from both the state and from
its shareholders .... ."66 Each of these views has varying implications for
the debate about the propriety and scope of corporate social responsibil-
ity.67 Both the artificial entity view and the real entity view allow corpo-
rations to engage in socially responsible activities that fall outside the
scope of the profit-maximization principle.6 8 More importantly,
whatever view dominates will have important consequences regarding
the propriety of abusive tax positions. 9 The First Circuit's decision in
Textron, however, is an example of how to bypass the controversial
debate surrounding corporate social responsibility and corporate law,
while still affirming the proposition that corporations have certain
responsibilities owed to society-for example, the payment of taxes.
This is a critical aspect of the First Circuit's decision because it shows
an alternative to making an outright choice between sides of the corpo-
rate social responsibility debate. Indeed, the First Circuit's jurisprudence
in Textron shows how the judiciary can side with society-represented
by the IRS-to the detriment of socially irresponsible firms.
61. Id. see also EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 51, at 38 ("A manager told to serve two
masters (a little for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is
answerable to neither.").
62. Avi-Yonah & Sivan, supra note 49, at 154.
63. See generally Adolf A. Berle Jr., The Corporation and Classical Economic Theory, in
THE FIRMAS S AN Errrrry 95-104 (Yuri Biondi et al. eds., 2007); Avi-Yonah, supra note 27, at
6-8.
64. See Avi-Yonah & Sivan, supra note 49, at 155.
65. Avi-Yonah, supra note 27, at 2.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 7-10.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 2 ("From the perspective of the corporation, if engaging in [corporate social
responsibility] is a legitimate corporate function, then corporations can also be expected to pay
taxes to bolster society as part of their assumption of [corporate social responsibility].").
6532011]
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D. The Work Product Doctrine and Tax Accrual Workpapers
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure broadened the scope of dis-
covery.70 "Under the prior federal practice, the pre-trial functions of
notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation were performed pri-
marily and inadequately by the pleadings."" With the formulation of
new open discovery rules, "civil trials in federal court no longer need be
carried on in the dark."72 Indeed, "[t]he way is now clear . . . for the
parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before trial."" However, "the [e]xpansion of the scope of discovery ...
created tension between an attorney's obligation to his [or her] client
and his [or her] duty to respond to discovery requests."7 4 Consequently,
"[c]ourts developed the work product" doctrine" to ease this tension.""
"In origin, the work product privilege derives from the Supreme Court's
decision in Hickman v. Taylor. . . ."I In Hickman, the Supreme Court
first elaborated and refined the scope of the work product doctrine, while
setting forth the policy rationales that have informed later work product
decisions. First, the Court noted that "[tihe work product privilege ... is
intended to preserve a zone of privacy in which a lawyer can prepare
and develop legal theories and strategy 'with an eye toward litigation,'
free from unnecessary intrusion by his adversaries."" Second, the Court
indicated that if attorneys were required to disclose their work product,
then sharp practices would develop because "much of what is now put
down in writing would remain unwritten."so Finally, the work product
doctrine preserves the adversarial system by preventing parties from
free-riding on the efforts of their adversaries."
70. See Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 760, 765 (1983).
71. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947).
72. Id. at 501.
73. Id.
74. Special Project, supra note 70, at 765.
75. Generally, there are two kinds of work product-ordinary work product and opinion work
product. Ordinary work product includes the following: "witness statements, investigative reports,
interviews and intraoffice memoranda ... [and] recordings prepared in anticipation of litigation."
Id. at 796. Opinion work product includes the following: a lawyer's legal strategy, inferences, and
mental impressions. See id. at 818-19. The central difference between these two types of work
product is the level of protection they receive. Typically, opinion work product receives much
greater protection that ordinary work product. See id. at 791.
76. Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure "codifies the principles articulated
in Hickman." United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1197 (2d Cir. 1998).
77. Id.
78. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc).
79. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1196 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947)).
80. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
81. See id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Discovery was hardly intended to enable a




At this point, it is important to note one of the major exceptions to
work product protection. Specifically, "work product protection does not
extend to documents that are prepared in the ordinary course of business
or that would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective
of the litigation."8 2 Because an ordinary course of business exception is
not found anywhere in the language of Rule 26(b)(3),11 courts adopting
this exception rely on the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 26(b)(3). 84
However, "some courts and commentators have criticized use of the
ordinary course of business characterization as more than a rule of
thumb."" Critics argue that the exception "upsets the effective operation
of rule 26(b)(3)." 8 6 The ordinary course of business exception plays a
critical role in analyzing whether tax accrual workpapers are entitled to
work product protection.
The leading case discussing work product protection for tax accrual
workpapers is United States v. Arthur Young & Co." In Arthur Young,
the IRS brought an enforcement action against the independent auditor
of a corporation it was investigating." The IRS sought from the
accounting firm-Arthur Young & Co.-the tax accrual workpapers it
created in preparation to verify the corporation's financial statements.8 9
Arthur Young & Co. refused to turn over the workpapers-as per
instructions from the corporation they audited-and asserted that the
workpapers were not relevant to any IRS investigation and that the the
work product doctrine immunized the documents.90 The Supreme Court
held that the workpapers are relevant to an IRS investigation and that
workpapers prepared by an independent auditor are not entitled to work
product protection.91
However, the Court never decided the question of whether
workpapers prepared by a corporation's attorneys are entitled to work
product protection. 92 Consequently, the circuits have split on the proper
inquiry to conduct in answering the question of whether tax accrual
82. Textron, 577 F.3d at 30 (quoting Maine v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir.
2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note ("Materials assembled in the
ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other
non-litigation purposes are not under the qualified immunity provided by this subdivision."); see
also Special Project, supra note 70, at 848.
85. Special Project, supra note 70, at 849.
86. Id. at 852.
87. 465 U.S. 805, 815-21 (1984).
88. Id. at 808.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 809-11.
91. Id. at 818.
92. See id. at 807.
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workpapers prepared by a corporation's attorneys are entitled to work
product protection. In effect, the circuits have developed varying views
on what it means to create a document "in anticipation of litigation."9 4
The issue is particularly cloudy "as to documents which, although pre-
pared because of expected litigation, are intended to inform a business
decision influenced by the prospects of litigation." 95 Essentially, tax
accrual workpapers are such documents.
In United States v. El Paso Co., the Fifth Circuit laid down its view
on the scope of work product protection afforded tax accrual
workpapers. 96 In El Paso, the IRS issued a summons to El Paso's chief
tax attorney, seeking the corporation's tax accrual workpapers.9" The
attorney refused to turn over the documents, citing a variety of privi-
leges, including the work product doctrine.98 The Fifth Circuit held that
the tax accrual workpapers were not entitled to work product protection
because "[t]he primary motivating force behind the tax pool analysis . . .
is not to ready El Paso for litigation over its tax returns. Rather, the
primary motivation is to anticipate, for financial reporting purposes,
what the impact of litigation might be on the company's tax liability." 99
In United States v. Adlman, the Second Circuit provided an alterna-
tive definition for the phrase "in anticipation of litigation.""o In Adlman,
the IRS issued a summons to a corporation's attorney, seeking a memo-
randum 0 1 he prepared, which evaluated the tax implications of a pro-
posed merger. 102 The attorney refused to turn over the documents,
asserting, among other things, the work product privilege.10 3 The Second
Circuit held that "[w]here a document is created because of' 0" the pros-
pect of litigation, analyzing the likely outcome of that litigation, it does
93. See generally United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198-1203 (2d Cir. 1998)
(providing a discussion of the various inquiries adopted by the courts).
94. See id. at 1197 (noting that commentators and courts have a wide range of views on the
meaning of the phrase "in anticipation of litigation").
95. Id. at 1197-98.
96. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 543 (5th Cir. 1982) (focusing on the
"primary motivating force behind the preparation of the documents").
97. Id. at 534.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 543.
100. See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202.
101. Although not exactly tax accrual workpapers, the memorandum "was a 58-page detailed
legal analysis of likely IRS challenges to the reorganization and the resulting tax refund claim
. ." Id. at 1195.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1196.
104. The Second Circuit adopted the work product inquiry developed by the Wright and Miller
treatise, which states "that documents should be deemed prepared 'in anticipation of litigation' . . .
if 'in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the
document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of
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not lose protection under this formulation merely because it is created in
order to assist with a business decision."105 Importantly, the Second Cir-
cuit repudiated the "primary motivating purpose" test embraced by the
Fifth Circuit. First, the Second Circuit noted that the "[tjhe test of Rule
26(b)(3) does not limit its protection to materials prepared to assist at
trial. To the contrary, the text of the Rule clearly sweeps more
broadly."'" Second, "the Rule takes pains to grant special protection to
. . . documents setting forth legal analysis."o 7 Indeed, "the Rule directs
that 'the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of . .. [a party or its representa-
tive] concerning the litigation."' 10 Third, "[f]raming the inquiry as
whether the primary or exclusive purpose of the document was to assist
in litigation threatens to deny protection to documents that implicate key
concerns underlying the work-product doctrine." 10
Significantly, in Maine v. U.S. Department of Interior, the First
Circuit adopted the test set forth by the Second Circuit in Adlman.'1 o
The central dispute of the case centered on Maine's Freedom of Infor-
mation Act requests from several government agencies "for documents
relating to the efforts of the Services to list Atlantic Salmon in eight
rivers within Maine under the protection of the Endangered Species
Act.""' The United States Department of Interior (DOI) claimed work
product protection for several hundred documents."12 On appeal, the
DOI argued that the district court used the wrong standard when it held
"that the documents are protected by the attorney work-product privilege
only if the 'primary motivating factor' for their creation was to assist in
litigation." The DOI asserted that the Second Circuit, in Adlman, used
the correct standard for work product protection-specifically, that a
document is protected if it can be "'fairly said to have been prepared or
obtained because of the prospect of litigation.' "114 The First Circuit
agreed with the DOI and held that it "agree[d] with the formulation of
litigation."' Id. at 1202 (quoting 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L.
MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024 (1994)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1198.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (1998)); accord FED. R. Cry. P. 26(b)(3) (noting that
the court "must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning the litigation").
109. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199.
110. See Maine v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that the First
Circuit "agree[s] with the formulation of the work-product rule adopted in AdIman").
11l. Id. at 63.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 67.
114. Id. at 68 (quoting Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202).
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the work-product rule adopted in Adlman.""'5 Moreover, "it was error to
require the DOI to demonstrate that the withheld documents were cre-
ated primarily for litigation purposes in order to claim the work-product
privilege .... "06 However, in Textron, the First Circuit appears to have
changed course, though it does not acknowledge as much. "'
III. IN PLAIN SIGHT: TEXTRON AND THE FIGHT FOR
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
A. Sham Transactions and Regulatory Battles
In 2003, the IRS decided to audit Textron's "corporate income tax
liability for the years 1998-2001.""'1 "In reviewing Textron's 2001
return, the IRS determined that a Textron subsidiary . .. had engaged in
nine listed" 9 transactions." 12 0 Specifically, Textron's subsidiary "had
purchased equipment from a foreign utility or transit operator and leased
it back to the seller on the same day." 2 1 Such a transaction is commonly
referred to as a sale-in, lease out transaction (SILO),122 which, in effect,
allows "tax-exempt or tax-indifferent organizations-for example, a tax-
exempt charity or city-owned transit authority-to transfer depreciation
and interest deductions, from which they cannot benefit, to other taxpay-
ers who use them to shelter income from tax."123 Consequently, the IRS
will not respect such transactions where they lack economic
substance. 124
After Textron refused to show spreadsheets documenting the
SILOs, the IRS issued a summons pursuant to section 7602 of the
Code, 25 seeking Textron's tax accrual workpapers.126 Textron refused
to hand over the workpapers and "[t]he IRS brought an enforcement
action in federal district court in Rhode Island."' 2 7 Textron contended
that the IRS was not entitled to the workpapers on a variety of grounds,
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 33 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe majority purports to follow Maine but really conducts a new analysis of the
history of the work-product doctrine . . .
118. Id. at 23.
119. The IRS maintains an active and current list of transactions that it considers abusive. See
Internal Revenue Service, Recognized Abusive and Listed Transactions-LMSB Tier I Issues,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html.
120. Textron, 577 F.3d at 23.
121. Id. at 23-24.
122. Id. at 24.
123. Id.
124. See I.R.S. Notice 2005-13, 2005-9 I.R.B. 630 (Feb. 11, 2009).
125. See I.R.C. § 7602 (2006).
126. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 24; see also discussion supra Part II.B and note 40.
127. Textron, 577 F.3d at 24 (citing I.R.C. § 7604(a) (2006)).
CURBING CORPORATE ABUSE
including a claim of work product protection for the documents. 12 8 Ulti-
mately, the district court "denied the petition for enforcement." 29 The
district court held that Textron's workpapers were protected by the work
product privilege because, though the workpapers "were useful in get-
ting a 'clean' opinion from their accountants regarding the the adequacy
of the [contingency] reserve amount, there would have been no need to
create a reserve . .. if Textron had not anticipated a dispute with the IRS
that was likely to result in litigation or some other adversarial proceed-
ing.""' "On appeal, a divided panel upheld the district court's decision.
The en banc court then granted the [IRS's] petition for
rehearing .... ."131
B. Work Product Recast: The Majority Opinion's New Standard
The majority's analysis begins by maneuvering its way out of the
deferential clear error standard of review to the much more lax de novo
standard. 13 2 The majority simultaneously changes the legal standard
required for work product protection, while asserting that the district
court made an error of law when it followed the prior standard.133 First,
the majority explains that the district court never found that "the
workpapers were prepared for use in possible litigation .... After
sorting through some of the evidence and witness statements, the major-
ity concludes that "[a]ny experienced litigator would describe the tax
accrual workpapers as tax documents and not as case preparation materi-
als."' 3 1 Of course, then the legal question becomes whether such docu-
ments are entitled to work product protection.136
First, the majority examines Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3), finding
that "[flrom the outset, the focus of work product protection has been on
materials prepared for use in litigation, whether the litigation was under-
way or merely anticipated."1 37 Indeed, the majority goes on to refine its
statement, narrowing the scope of the work product inquiry, noting that
the "phrase used in the codified rule-'prepared in anticipation of litiga-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 25 (citing United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 150, 155 (D.R.I.
2007)).
130. Id. at 25-26 (quoting Textron, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 150).
131. Id.
132. See id. at 26 (noting that one of the difficulties presented by the case "stems from the
mutability of language used in the governing rules and a confusion between issues of fact and
issues of [law]").
133. See id. at 26-27.
134. Id. at 27.
135. Id. at 28.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
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tion or for trial'-did not . . . mean prepared for some purpose other
than litigation. ... " Ultimately, the majority relies on its tactile sensi-
tivities, noting that tax accrual workpapers simply do not have the
"touch and feel of materials prepared for a current or possible . . . law-
suit."' 39 Channeling a schoolyard ethos, the majority concludes that "no
one with experience of law suits" would place workpapers within the
same category of documents prepared in anticipation of litigation.1 40
Second, the majority looks to prior First Circuit precedent. Indeed,
in one fell swoop the majority reconciles its decision with Maine by
locking in on the court's elaboration of the ordinary course of busi-
nessl41 exception in that decision. 14 The majority notes that, "[iun
Maine, we said that work product protection does not extend to 'docu-
ments that are prepared in the ordinary course of business or that would
have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the litiga-
tion. "'143 Consequently, "Maine applies straightforwardly to Textron's
tax audit work papers . . . [because they] were prepared in the ordinary
course of business . . . ."'" Interestingly, the majority regards the Fifth
Circuit's "primary purpose" test favorably, 145 noting that the sole pur-
pose of Textron's workpapers was to "prepare financial statements."146
Finally, the majority reconciles its decision with the central policy
rationales of the work product doctrine. First, the work product doctrine
"is not . . . designed to help the lawyer prepare corporate documents or
other materials prepared in the ordinary course of business," 147 and,
therefore, the doctrine's goal of protecting the litigation process remains
unobstructed.14 8 Second, any concern "about discouraging sound prepa-
ration for a law suit" is moot because tax accrual workpapers "have to
be prepared by exchange-listed companies to comply with the securities
laws and accounting principles for certified financial statements."' 4 9
Third, any unfairness to Textron, resulting from the disclosure of its
workpapers, pales in comparison to the IRS's need to collect revenue




141. See discussion supra Part II.D.
142. Textron, 577 F.3d at 24.
143. Id. (quoting Maine v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 70 (1st Cir. 2002)).
144. Id.
145. But see Maine, 298 F.3d at 68.
146. Textron, 577 F.3d at 30.
147. Id. at 30-31.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 31.
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porting of corporate taxes.""'o Ultimately, the majority denies Textron's
workpapers work product protection, explaining that the "work product
privilege is aimed at protecting work done for litigation, not in preparing
financial statements."15 '
C. Patently Unrestrained: The Dissent's Attack
Judge Torruella's dissent challenges the majority's opinion on sev-
eral fronts, focusing on the doctrinal liberties taken by the majority and
its imposition of the strictest work product inquiry in the land.'52 First,
Judge Torruella accuses the majority of "quietly reject[ing] circuit pre-
cedent."15 1 In Maine, the First Circuit "adopted the broader 'because of
test, which had been . . . explained ... in the Second Circuit decision in
Adlman . . . ."154 However, the majority "really conducts a new analysis
of the history of the work-product doctrine and concludes that docu-
ments must be "'prepared for any litigation or trial.' "'ss Simply, "[t]he
majority's opinion is . . . stunning in its . . . suggestion that it is respect-
ing rather than overruling Maine."'5 6
Second, Judge Torruella denounces the majority's "prepared for"
test as a bad rule.'15 Not only is the majority's rule inconsistent with the
plain language of Rule 26(b)(3) but it is also inconsistent with policy
concerns announced in Hickman.' 8 Specifically, the majority reads the
phrase "'anticipation of litigation' . . . out of the rule by requiring a
showing that documents be prepared for trial."15 9 Moreover, the major-
ity's rule will allow the IRS to free ride on the work of corporate tax
attorneys by denying the attorneys any privacy. 6 0 Ironically, "because
of these very same concerns about privacy and fairness, the IRS itself
[has] argued for the protection of its documents prepared for the dual
purposes of helping the IRS understand the litigation risks that might




152. Id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 32-33 (citing Maine v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002) ("In
light of the decisions of the Supreme Court, we therefore agree with the formulation of the work-
product rule adopted in AdIman and by five other courts of appeals.")).
155. Id. at 33.
156. Id.




161. Id. at 36 n.13 (citing Delaney, Migdail, & Young, Chartered v. IRS, 826 F.2d 124 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
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Finally, Judge Torruella notes that the majority boldly casts aside
the factual findings made by the district court and replaces them with its
own.16 2 Judge Torruella denounces the majority's sly tactic of exalting
in the fact that the district court failed to make a "for use" finding,
though such a test "is not and has never been the law of [the First Cir-
cuit]."6 Indeed, Judge Torruella's dissent questions why the standard
of review is not clear error. " Many of the dissent's criticisms reflect a
real discomfort with the majority's jurisprudence, which consists of doc-
trinal failings and an unabashed proclivity for sleights of hand.
IV. REGULATORS MOUNT UP: A JURISPRUDENTIAL SPACE AND
ITS DANGERS
A. Harnessing Corporate Abuse
The majority's decision to deny work product protection to Tex-
tron's tax accrual workpapers represents a significant step forward in tax
enforcement and collection efforts. The decision also represents a refusal
to expand work product protection to its breaking point. More impor-
tantly, Textron represents a substantial collaboration between the judici-
ary and the IRS in curbing corporate social irresponsibility. Indeed, the
majority-via a jurisprudence born from the collision between tax pol-
icy and the work product doctrine-manages to bypass complex and
controversial notions about the proper social role of corporations.
Arguably, the more practical and tangible result of the majority's
decision is a potential reduction of abusive tax shelters. As a stated goal
of the court, 16 5 curbing tax shelters will likely be one of Textron's last-
ing effects. "Under our tax system, taxpayers self-assess their liability,
and taxpayers engaged in aggressive tax planning enjoy greater flexibil-
ity in their self-assessment because of the legal ambiguity surrounding
their transactions." 16 6 Consequently, corporations are often able to
occult their more risky tax positions, hiding transactional histories
within exceedingly complex and voluminous tax returns and accompa-
nying disclosure statements.167 The IRS, in effect, is at the mercy of
162. See id. at 39 (noting that "[t]he majority makes no effort to reject these factual findings,
but simply recharacterizes the facts as suits its purposes").
163. Id.
164. Id. ("[T]he actual purpose of the documents' creators ... is a factual issue, and the
majority makes no effort to explain why such issue should be reviewed as a legal conclusion.").
165. Id. at 32 (majority opinion) ("IRS access [to workpapers] serves the legitimate, and
important, function of detecting and disallowing abusive tax shelters.").
166. Ventry, supra note 42, at 871.
167. See id.; Dennis J. Ventry Jr., A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, TAX
NoTEs 875, 881 (May 18, 2009) ("The audit documents at issue for the applicant in Textron filled
nine four-drawer file cabinets, and its consolidated tax return exceeded 4,000 pages covering more
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substantial informational asymmetries. "In the world of tax regulation,
taxpayers and their advisers possess the information that tax regulators
seek. The goal is to keep as much of the information from the IRS as
possible, and taxpayers pay considerable sums of money to those advis-
ers most skilled at concealment."1s Therefore, "[d]enying immunity to
tax accrual workpapers and protecting a vigorous IRS summons power
appropriately mitigates the severe informational asymmetries separating
the government from the private sector."1 69 Moreover, the majority's
denial of work product protection aligns the judiciary with "legislative
and regulatory antishelter efforts . . . ."Io Although government efforts
to curb tax avoidance are nearly a century old, "government antishelter
efforts have accelerated significantly over the last several years, with an
emphasis on disclosure and transparency.""'
The majority's decision avoids an overexpansion of the work prod-
uct doctrine. First, the work product doctrine serves the purpose of pro-
tecting documents prepared in anticipation of litigation. However, tax
accrual workpapers are never prepared with an objectively reasonable
anticipation of litigation because of the "infinitesimal odds that items in
tax accrual workpapers will be the subject of litigation . . . ."172 For
example, in Textron's "last eight audit cycles, dating back to 1959, the
government proposed thousands of adjustments to the taxpayer's report-
ing positions. Yet the parties resorted to litigation over disputed issues
just three times.""' Therefore, the majority's decision avoids expanding
"the work product doctrine significantly beyond its historical role of pro-
tecting the adversarial process."l 7 4 Second, the majority's decision
avoids the perverse result "whereby more aggressive, abusive behavior
receives a greater degree of protection than less aggressive, compliant
behavior."1 15 Such a standard "would blow a hole in the fisc . .. [a]nd it
would immunize nearly every document analyzing the potential tax ben-
efits of a transaction because the analysis necessarily involves a discus-
sion of the position's likelihood of success on the merits.""7 The
majority's decision refuses to give tax advisers such blanket immunity.
Finally, the majority's decision provides an illustration of a poten-
than 190 different entities ... [and] [b]uried in the return was an opaque reference to the nine sale-
in, lease-out prohibited tax shelters .....
168. Ventry, supra note 42, at 879.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 871.
171. See id. at 880-81.
172. Ventry, supra note 167, at 882.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Ventry, supra note 42, at 878-79.
176. Id. at 879.
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tial jurisprudential strategy, which other courts can use to overcome
dominant views regarding the nature and purpose of corporations and
their role in society. Agency theory, which remains the dominant view
regarding corporate law in the United States, denounces corporate social
responsibility as inconsistent with the nature and purpose of firms."'
The sole purpose of firms is to maximize profits.1 78 Under this view, tax
avoidance is necessarily consistent with the structure and purpose of cor-
porate law because managers that engage in tax avoidance are working
under the wealth-maximization principle.17 9 Consequently, a judiciary
that adheres to a contractual view of corporate law will suffer from a
certain degree of ambivalence when imposing social responsibilities on
firms. Of course, this assumes a judiciary working within the confines of
corporate law. But what if the judiciary could curb corporate social irre-
sponsibility from outside the intellectual fences of corporate law and its
assumptions?
In Textron, the majority found a space from which to harness a
socially deviant corporation-Textron. Indeed, at the intersection of the
rationales and notions of the work product doctrine and tax policy, the
majority located a site from which it could circumvent prevailing
notions of corporate law. Informed by the strong principles of fairness
underlying taxation,' and by the driving rationales of the work product
doctrine,'s' the majority managed to overcome and trump Textron's
pleas for the judiciary to essentially stay out of the chess match corpora-
tions play with the IRS-and, inevitably, with the public. Indeed, the
majority positioned itself alongside the IRS as a new player in the regu-
lation of corporate social irresponsibility. What the decision in Textron
shows is that the judiciary can locate jurisprudential spaces from which
to brush aside the traditional views regarding corporate activity.182 The
majority in Textron showed how the doctrinal and policy rationales of
ancillary areas of the law could converge to liberate courts from viewing
the imposition of corporate social responsibilities as inconsistent with a
capitalist marketplace. Perhaps, tax evasion is so clearly socially delete-
rious that the First Circuit's decision is unexceptional. However, what
are exceptional are Textron's protracted efforts'83 to promote an expan-
177. See discussion supra Part II.C.
178. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
179. See discussion Part H.A.
180. See United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc) (noting that
"Textron apparently thinks it is 'unfair' for the government to have access to its spreadsheets, but
tax collection is not a game ... [and] [u]nderpaying taxes threatens the essential public interest in
revenue collection").
181. See id. at 30-31.
182. See generally EASTERBROOK & FiscHE., supra note 51, at 93-100.
183. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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sive view of work product protection. Undoubtedly, Textron recognized
that the battle against corporate social irresponsibility takes place on
many fronts.
B. Doctrinal Missteps and the Merits of Restraint
Although the majority in Textron takes positive strides in the direc-
tion of reducing tax evasion and promoting corporate social responsibil-
ity, it also places the legitimacy of its decision in question. "Basic to the
popular perception of the judicial process is the notion of government of
law, not people. Law is, in this conception, separate from-and
'above'-politics, economics, culture, and the values or preferences of
judges or any person."' 8 4 Indeed, "[i]n this separation resides the law's
ability to be objective, principled, and fair."'15 Of course, scholars and
practitioners generally consider such a view an idealistic and simplistic
representation of the judicial process." 6 Realistically, a variety of fac-
tors and considerations, ranging from political propensities to interpre-
tive style, affect a judge's decision and analysis.18 7 All of this is an old
story and generally accepted, evident by the legions of litigators who
continue to view judge shopping as a worthwhile activity.' Ultimately,
the legitimacy of the judicial process likely rests on how well any given
court gives the appearance of the idealized form of jurisprudence, which
includes "judicial subservience . . . to precedent."18 9 The majority in
Textron placed the legitimacy of its decision in question by doctrinal
shortcomings, by unnecessarily revising the work product doctrine, and
by failing to account for the policy implications of its holding. Judicial
decisions perceived as illegitimate severely restrict the ability of other
courts to design opportunities to rein in corporate irresponsibility.
First, as Judge Torruella's dissent correctly points out, the majority
failed to explain how it was able to review de novo whether Textron's
workpapers were prepared in anticipation of litigation, especially after
the district court made factual findings on the matter.190 Moreover, the
majority slyly characterizes the issue as a legal question on the ground
that the district court never made a finding that Textron's workpapers
184. David Kairys, Introduction to THE PoLMCs OF LAw at 11 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed.,
1998) (footnote omitted), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=841469.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1-3.
187. See id. at 1-4.
188. See id. at 3.
189. Id. at 2-3 (noting that "perceived deviations" from the idealized notion of the judicial
process "undermines the legitimacy and power of the courts").
190. See United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 39 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J.,
dissenting).
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were prepared for use in litigation.'9 1 Of course, the district court could
not make a "for use" finding because it did not even know that that was
the proper inquiry since it was not the law of the First Circuit.19 2 Rather,
the majority castigates the district court for finding that the workpapers
were prepared because of anticipated litigation. However, that is the spe-
cific standard adopted by the First Circuit in Maine'9 3 and affirmed in
the majority opinion in Textron.'94 As the dissent notes, "Discarding a
district court's factual findings on causation without any demonstration
of clear error is not within [the] court's proper appellate function." 95
The majority's new work product inquiry, which calls upon courts
to ask if documents are prepared for use in litigation, overly narrows the
scope of work product protection. Specifically, "[n]owhere does Rule
26(b)(3) state that a document must have been prepared to aid in the
conduct of litigation in order to constitute work product, much less pri-
marily or exclusively to aid in litigation."' 9 6 "There is no reason to
believe that "anticipation of litigation" was meant as a synonym for 'for
trial.'""' The majority's rule allows discovery of "'notes and memo-
randa written by Textron's in-house tax attorneys [that] reflect[ ] their
opinions as to which items should be included on the spread-
sheet ... [and] explain the legal rationale underpinning Textron's views
of its litigation chances."198
Even scholars favoring stricter work product standards for tax
accrual workpapers acknowledge the risk of too strict a rule' 99 and,
therefore, suggest a sliding scale of protection.2 " Indeed, the majority's
strict work product standard is overinclusive, as it does not distinguish
between taxpayers for whom the likelihood of litigation is certain nor for
those that engaged in prohibited transactions in order to wage a good-
faith challenge to the IRS's position. 20 ' The majority's new rule is espe-
cially troubling because the court did not need to revise its work product
standard to reach its goal of giving the IRS access to a firm's
workpapers. The majority could have easily left the "because of" test in
place, while merely finding that tax accrual workpapers fell outside the
191. Id. at 30.
192. Id. at 39.
193. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
194. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 30.
195. Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
196. Id. at 34 (quoting United States v. Adlman 134 F.3d 1194, 1197-98 (2d Cir. 1998)).
197. Id. at 35.
198. Id. at 37.
199. See Ventry, supra note 42, at 884 ("Strictly applying the work product doctrine in the tax





scope of the doctrine because such documents are prepared in the ordi-
nary course of business.202 Such a result avoids reaching far outside the
tax context, which is what the majority's decision will likely do. Impor-
tantly, since enactment of the "Sarbanes-Oxley Act . . . the need to pre-
serve [a] zone of privacy is even more necessary for lawyers to serve
their corporate clients in previously unforeseen ways, navigating com-
pliance with growingly complex regulatory schemes that necessarily
blend questions of potential liability with important business considera-
tions and reporting obligations."2 03
V. CONCLUSION
In assessing the First Circuit's approach in Textron, two questions
emerge. First, should firms be socially responsible? Second, what hap-
pens when courts decide to make them responsible? The first question
has a well-developed pedigree of debate, analyzing the issue ex ante.2
The second question may be more interesting because it arises ex post in
fact-specific and context-specific situations. The First Circuit's decision
in Textron is exemplary in its problematic use of the work product doc-
trine and tax policy to rein in abusive tax shelters, thereby holding a
massive corporate entity responsible where its management sought profit
maximization to the detriment of society. Can courts impose social
responsibilities on firms by removing advantages that doctrines outside
corporate law provide? Essentially, the First Circuit shows how courts
can manipulate and gut doctrines that firms rely on to avoid and fight
social accountability. Of course, such a strategy risks a great deal. First,
a poorly reasoned decision appears illegitimate. Second, it is uncertain
how well any given ancillary doctrine can absorb a forceful remodeling.
For example, the First Circuit, to reach its decision, fashioned a new
inquiry for work product doctrine that may be inconsistent with the
scope of the doctrine as envisioned in Hickman and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Third, waging an indirect fight on corporate social irre-
sponsibility via jurisprudential sites outside the corporate law context
will create uncertainty, raising transactions costs for firms. Moreover,
such an indirect fight walks and talks like judicial activism.
However, a court can mitigate an appearance of illegitimacy or
202. See id. at 872 ("[Tlax accrual workpapers are generated every year in a public
corporation's ordinary course of business, and would be generated whether or not the company
anticipates any specific or potential litigation.").
203. Supplemental Brief for Amici Curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. & Ass'n of
Corporate Counsel Supporting Textron Inc. & in Favor of Affirmance at 8, Textron 577 F.3d 21
(No. 07-2631), available at http://www.acc.com/vl/public/AmicusBrief/loader.cfmcsModule=
security/getfile&pageid=207212+.
204. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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judicial activism if its reasoning appears sound and tempered by a light
hand. Via a commitment to a minimalist approach and sound logic, a
court faced with a corporation dodging any type of social responsibility
can refashion ancillary doctrines-doctrines outside the corporate law
context-to make life very difficult on firms. Moreover, ancillary doc-
trines are more likely to be able to absorb minimal structural changes
than more aggressive plying. Putting aside the normative issues of
whether or not courts are the right actors to curb corporate social irre-
sponsibility, the reality is that judges can and will act. What matters is
that the fallout from such action does not taint the touchstone doctrines
of other areas of the law.
